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FORUM-SELECTION CLAUSES: SHOULD STATE OR FED-
ERAL LAW DETERMINE VALIDITY IN DIVERSITY
ACTIONS?--Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 108 S. Ct.
2239 (1988).
Abstract: Forum-selection clauses are contractual provisions that confine future litiga-
tion to particular c~urts. Such clauses are common in interstate contracts despite uncer-
tainty concerning their validity. Before Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., the
circuit courts were divided as to whether federal courts with diversity jurisdiction were
compelled to determine forum-selection clause validity in accordance with state law, as
directed by Erie PR. Co. v. Tompkins. In Stewart, the United States Supreme Court ruled
that federal courts did not have to apply state law. Instead, the court held that the federal
transfer statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), governed forum-selection clause validity. A statu-
tory interpretation analysis demonstrates 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) was never intended to gov-
era forum-selection clause validity. State law should govern the clause's validity in order
to prevent forum shopping and the inequitable administration of the laws.
Forum-selection clauses are often included in interstate contracts
despite uncertainty concerning their validity. Some states refuse to
enforce such clauses. Must a federal court located in a state that disre-
gards forum-selection clauses apply the state's rule in a diversity case?
The United States Supreme Court recently answered that question
in the negative in Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp.' The
Court in Stewart ruled that a forum-selection clause's validity is gov-
erned by the federal transfer statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404.2 In the analy-
sis, this Note will first demonstrate that the federal transfer statute
should not determine the validity of forum-selection clauses because
the statute disqualifies itself. In addition, the legislative history and
circumstances surrounding the enactment indicate 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a) never was intended to govern an area of law predominantly
governed by state law. Assuming 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) does not govern
forum-selection clause validity, this Note will further argue that a fed-
eral court with diversity jurisdiction must apply state law in order to
prevent forum shopping and the inequitable administration of the
laws.
1. 108 S. Ct. 2239 (1988).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (1982).
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I. OVERVIEW OF FORUM-SELECTION CLAUSES AND
THE FEDERAL TRANSFER STATUTE
A forum-selection clause is a contractual provision that confines
future litigation between parties to the courts of a particular state.
Such a clause helps to eliminate uncertainties inherent in interstate or
international contracts by allowing contracting parties to pre-arrange
a fair and convenient forum for dispute resolution.4 As a result,
forum-selection clauses tend to encourage interstate trade by reducing
the fear of litigating in a foreign court.5
A. Judicial Treatment of Forum-Selection Clauses
Historically, American courts have disregarded forum-selection
clauses.6 Courts invalidated the clauses for a variety of reasons. It
was not considered proper for parties to privately encroach upon a
court's jurisdiction, nor were parties allowed to oust a court of its
jurisdiction by bargaining away their substantive rights.7 Many courts
simply determined that a forum-selection clause violated the state's
public policy.8
Some courts may also have had unstated reasons for refusing to
enforce forum-selection clauses. Many were unwilling to force a local
party to litigate in a foreign forum.9 Judges were paid by the case and
may have felt that forum-selection clauses were a threat to their liveli-
hood. 1° As a result, these clauses were rarely enforced.
Forum-selection clauses began to gain favor in the early 1950's. 1
The Supreme Court sanctified the trend toward enforcing forum-selec-
3. Reese, The Contractual Forum: Situation in the United States, 13 AM. J. COMP. L. 187
(1964).
4. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1972); Gruson, Forum-Selection
Clauses in International and Interstate Commercial Agreements, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 133,
133-34.
5. See Bremen, 407 U.S. at 9; Gilbert, Choice of Forum Clauses in International and
Interstate Contracts, 65 Ky. L.J. 1, 3 (1976/77).
6. Bremen, 407 U.S. at 9; Nute v. Hamilton Mut. Ins. Co., 72 Mass. (6 Gray) 174, 184 (1856);
Gruson, supra note 4, at 138.
7. See, e.g., Insurance Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445, 451 (1874); Gilbert, supra note 5,
at 8; Gruson, supra note 4, at 139.
8. Gilbert, supra note 5, at 8.
9. Id. at 9.
10. Id.
11. One of the first major cases to enforce such a clause was William H. Muller & Co. v.
Swedish Am. Line Ltd., 224 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 903 (1955), overruled on
other grounds, Indussa Corp. v. S.S. Ramborg, 377 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1967). Muller was not the
first case to enforce a forum-selection clause but it "arouse[d] an interest in re-evaluating the
traditional view." Gruson, supra note 4, at 144-45.
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tion clauses in the landmark case of The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore
Co.12 The Court held that forum-selection clauses are prima facie
valid and therefore should be enforced unless unreasonable. 13
Bremen was an admiralty case and therefore not binding on a fed-
eral court with diversity jurisdiction. 14 Many federal district courts
sitting in diversity, however, have adopted the Bremen rule. 15 Some of
the courts that applied the rule to diversity cases did so because there
was no conflict between state and federal law,16 while others applied
the rule even when it conflicted with state law. 7 Not all circuit
courts, however, have applied the Bremen rule to diversity actions.
Instead, some circuits have determined that the law of the state is
controlling.'
B. The Federal Transfer Statute: 28 US. C. § 1404(a)
The transfer statute allows a district court, at its discretion, to trans-
fer a case to a more convenient forum even though the court's jurisdic-
tion is technically proper.19 The statute was enacted in 1948 in
accordance with the general principles of the doctrine of forum non
conveniens. 0 Congress intended 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) to mitigate the
harshness of the forum non conveniens doctrine, which permitted a
court to dismiss a case-even though jurisdiction was proper-when
the action could have been brought in a more convenient forum.
21
12. 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
13. Id. at 10.
14. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641-42 (1981); see 19 C.
WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4514, at 257-59
(2d ed. 1982) [hereinafter 19 WRIGHT & MILLER].
15. See Gruson, supra note 4, at 149 n.58.
16. Comment, Forum Selection Clauses in Light of the Erie Doctrine and Federal Common
Law: Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corporation, 72 MINN. L. REv. 1090, 1096 n.32.
(1988).
17. Id. at 1096 n.33.
18. The Third and Eighth Circuits determined the validity of a forum-selection clause by
applying state law. For a list of the Third and Eighth Circuit cases that apply state law, see id. at
1097 n.34.
19. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1982).
20. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) revisors note (1982). For a discussion of the doctrine of forum non
conveniens, see infra note 79.
21. Dismissal under the doctrine of forum non conveniens can bar relief completely if the
statute of limitations has run while the action is pending in the inconvenient forum. Section
1404(a) alleviates the problem by transferring rather than dismissing the action. Norwood v.
Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 31 (1955) (citing Freight v. Modarelli, 196 F.2d 1010, 1011 (3d Cir.
1952)).
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A transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) results in a change in court-
rooms and not a change in substantive law.22 The transfer statute
restricts the transfer of a case to a court in which the action "might
have been brought. ' 23 The Supreme Court has interpreted the statute
to mean that a case can be transferred only to a court in which the
plaintiff could have instituted the action originally. 24 The transfer
statute applies to "any civil action."25 Although the Court has nar-
rowly interpreted where a case "might have been brought," it has not
attempted to limit the broad "any civil action" language of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a).26
The only legislative history to the enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)
is the revisor's note that bases the section on the doctrine offorum non
conveniens.27 This note is not particularly illuminating.28 Although
courts, under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), may transfer the case to the opti-
mal forum, some have argued that such transfers create more litiga-
tion effort than they are worth.29
C. Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp.
With the circuit courts split on the matter of which law-federal or
state-should determine a forum-selection clause's validity, the
Supreme Court resolved the dispute in Stewart Organization, Inc. v.
Ricoh Corp.30 Stewart, an Alabama corporation, negotiated a dealer-
ship sales agreement with the Ricoh Corporation to market Ricoh's
22. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 639 (1964). Applying the law of the transferee state
court would encourage the defendant to shop for the most advantageous law. Id. at 638-39.
23. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1982).
24. Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 344 (1960); see 15 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER & E.
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3845, at 323 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter 15
WRIGHT & MILLER].
25. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1982).
26. Some courts have held that § 1404(a) applies to cases removed to a federal court, cases in
admiralty even though admiralty claims are not civil actions for the purposes of 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1391-1393, and cases which are covered under specific venue statutes. 15 WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra note 24, § 3843, at 323.
27. Korbel, The Law of Federal Venue and Choice of the Most Convenient Forum, 15
RUTGERS L. REV. 607, 610 n.22 (1960-61).
28. 15 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 24, § 3841, at 320.
29. Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 268, 307
(1968/69) ("The theory is good, but it is practically unworkable. It would be mellow to try every
action in the most convenient forum. But deciding where that forum is costs altogether too
much time and money."); Green, Jury Trial and Mr. Justice Black 65 YALE L.J. 482, 494 n.36
(1956) ("As a delaying tactic [§ 1404(a)] has few equals." (emphasis in original)); Kitch, Section
1404(a) of the Judicial Code: In the Interest of Justice or Injustice?, 40 IND. L.J. 99, 141-42
(1965) (the burdens and delay of § 1404(a) motions outweigh the benefits).
30. 108 S. Ct. 2239 (1988).
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copiers.31 The contract contained a forum-selection clause requiring
that any action arising from the contract be brought in a court located
in New York City.32 Stewart, however, brought suit in an Alabama
federal district court, and alleged, inter alia,3 3 that Ricoh had
breached the contract. 4 Ricoh moved to either transfer the case to
New York under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)35 in accordance with the forum-
selection clause, or to dismiss on grounds of improper venue.36 The
district court denied the motion to transfer the case to New York
because it determined that state law governed the validity of a forum-
selection clause and that Alabama did not enforce such clauses. 37
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded with
instructions to transfer the case to New York in compliance with the
forum-selection clause.38  The court held that venue in general was
procedural and therefore governed by federal law. 39 Because forum-
selection clauses attempt to limit venue, the court held that such
clauses are also governed by federal law.' The clause in question was
31. Id. at 2241.
32. Id. at 2241 n.1. The clause read as follows:
Dealer and Ricoh agree that any appropriate state or federal district court located in the
Borough of Manhattan, New York City, New York, shall have exclusive jurisdiction over
any case or controversy arising under or in connection with this Agreement and shall be a
proper forum in which to adjudicate such case or controversy.
Id.
33. Stewart also brought an antitrust claim against Ricoh under 28 U.S.C. § 1337, but the
issue of how the antitrust claim should affect the district court's analysis was not raised by Ricoh.
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit therefore characterized the issue as a diversity
breach of contract case only. Id. at 2242 n.3.
34. Id. at 2241.
35. Id. For a discussion of § 1404(a) see supra text accompanying notes 19-29.
36. Ricoh made the motion to dismiss under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). Stewart, 108 S. Ct. at 2241.
Section 1406(a) allows a court to transfer a case to another court even though venue is improper
in the transferor court. 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (1982). Because Ricoh was doing business in the
Northern District of Alabama, and therefore venue was proper, the court denied the § 1406(a)
motion. Stewart, 108 S. Ct. at 2243, n.8.
37. Stewart, 108 S. Ct. at 2241.
38. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 810 F.2d 1066, 1071 (11th Cir. 1987), aff'd on other
grounds, 108 S. Ct. 2239 (1988).
39. Id at 1068. The court noted that Congress had enacted rules of venue for diversity
actions and had permitted the adoption of FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3) and 41(b). Id. FED. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(3) allows a party to raise the defense of improper venue by motion. FED. R. Civ. P.
41(b) allows a defendant, after plaintiff has completed the presentation of evidence, to move for
dismissal of an action for failure to prosecute. Granting a dismissal under FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b)
amounts to an adjudication on the merits unless the dismissal is granted because of a lack of
jurisdiction, improper venue, or for failure to join a party.
40. Stewart, 810 F.2d at 1068.
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deemed enforceable under the rules set forth in The Bremen v. Zapata
Off-Shore Co.41 Stewart appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court determined that the primary issue was whether
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) governed a forum-selection clause's validity.42
The majority opinion, by Justice Marshall, held that 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a) did govern the clause's validity because the statute is flexible
and discretionary and therefore broad enough to control the issue of
transfer.43 As a result, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) governed the parties' pri-
vate expression of their venue preferences embodied in the forum-
selection clause." The Supreme Court directed the district court to
consider the convenience of the stipulated forum, the fairness of the
transfer with respect to the forum-selection clause, and the parties'
relative bargaining power in deciding whether the clause should be
enforced.45
The majority, moreover, concluded that the question of a forum-
selection clause's validity was not an instance where both federal and
state law could apply, each controlling its intended sphere of coverage,
without conflict. 46  The Court recognized that 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)
called for the district court to weigh many factors and therefore was
not coextensive with Alabama's state policy against enforcing forum-
selection clauses. 47  The Court stated, however, that Congress
intended a multi-factored analysis and that a state policy that deter-
mined transferability on a single factor would defeat the balancing
intent of 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). 48 Therefore, the multi-factored analysis
of 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) was an additional reason why the section
should govern the validity of a forum-selection clause.49
After concluding that 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) governed forum-selection
clause validity, the Court noted that 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) represents a
41. 407 U.S. 1 (1972). For a discussion of the rule set forth in Bremen, see supra, text
accompanying notes 12-13.
42. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 108 S. Ct. 2239, 2243 (1988). The Court further stated
that if § 1404(a) is broad enough to govern forum-selection clause validity, it would control the
issue if the statute is a valid exercise of Congress' constitutional powers. Id. at 2242.
43. Id. at 2243-45.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 2244.
46. Id. at 2245 (citing Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 752 (1980)).
47. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 108 S. Ct. 2239, 2245 (1988). The Supreme Court in
Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 749-50 (1980) required a "direct collision" between
state and federal law in order for federal law to apply. The Supreme Court in Stewart, however,
determined that for a "direct collision" to exist, the federal statute or rule need not be perfectly
coextensive. Stewart, 108 S. Ct. at 2242 n.4.
48. Stewart, 108 S. Ct. at 2244.
49. Id. at 2244-45.
444
Vol. 64:439, 1989
Forum-Selection Clause Validity
valid exercise of Congress' authority under the Constitution."° The
majority determined that the enactment of the statute was within con-
stitutional bounds because it was a "housekeeping" rule enacted to
regulate procedural aspects of the federal courts."1
Justice Scalia, writing in dissent, agreed that the first question was
whether 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) governed the validity of forum-selection
clauses. He concluded that it did not for three reasons.5 2 First, the
transfer statute pertains only to present and future considerations of
convenience to determine whether to transfer a case, and does not
refer to past considerations as suggested by the majority.53 Second,
when 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) was enacted, cases concerning a contract's
validity were generally governed by state law.5" When Congress had
desired to preempt state contract law it had done so explicitly. 5
Third, since 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) should not govern forum-selection
clause validity, uniformity between federal and state courts should
have been the primary goal of the Court.5 6
Having concluded that 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) did not govern forum-
selection clause validity, the dissent considered whether the Court
could apply a judicial rule to govern the question 7 and determined
that it could not.58 Whether state or federal law governed forum-
selection clause validity depended on Whether such a law was substan-
tive or procedural.59 If it was substantive, the federal court would
have to apply the state's law in accordance with Erie R.R. Co. v.
Tompkins.' If a rule governing the validity of forum-selection clauses
was deemed procedural, the federal court could apply its own law. To
50. Id. at 2245.
51. Id. at 2245. The majority determined § 1404(a) was within congressional powers granted
under article III of the United States Constitution as augmented by the "Necessary and Proper
Clause." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. Article III of the Constitution together with the
"Necessary and Proper Clause" empower Congress to establish a federal court system and, by
implication, to establish procedural rules to govern litigation within the system. Burlington N.
R.R. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 5 n.3 (1987).
52. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 108 S. Ct. 2239, 2246-48 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 2246.
54. Id. at 2247.
55. Id.; see infra text accompanying notes 88-90.
56. Stewart, 108 S.Ct. at 2247. The dissent cited both Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S.
64, 74-77 (1938) and Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941) for support.
57. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 108 S. Ct. 2239, 2248 (1988).
58. Id. at 2249.
59. Id. at 2248-49.
60. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Erie overturned Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), and
determined that the Rules of Decision Act, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 92 (1789) (current version at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1652 (1982)), required federal district courts to apply a state's substantive common laws as well
as the state's legislative laws in federal diversity actions. For a further discussion of Erie and its
progeny see infra, notes 105-23 and accompanying text.
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determine whether the enforcement of forum-selection clauses was
substantive or procedural, the dissent applied the twin-aims test of
Erie: To discourage forum shopping and to avoid the inequitable
administration of the laws.61
The first part of the Erie test-to discourage forum shopping-
directed the use of state law.62 The dissent determined that a plaintiff
who wanted to avoid a transfer to the venue stipulated in a forum-
selection clause would probably sue in a state court that did not
enforce such clauses.63 The defendant would then remove to a federal
court in order to obtain the benefit of a more favorable federal law that
enforces forum-selection clauses. In a state that enforced forum-selec-
tion clauses, the plaintiff would probably sue in a federal court, hoping
that the other factors in a 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) analysis would invali-
date an otherwise valid forum-selection clause.64
In addition to encouraging forum shopping, the dissent argued,
applying a federal rule that enforced forum-selection clauses would
produce inequitable administration of the laws, and therefore would
violate the second Erie test.65 Inequitable administration of the laws
occurs when a difference between state and federal law promotes
unfair discrimination between citizens and non-citizens of a state.6 6
Whether discrimination between these groups is unfair depends upon
the importance of the matter in question.67 The dissent noted exam-
ples of other matters that were similar to or of "obviously lesser
importance" to questions of venue in which the Court held state law
controlled. 68  As a result, the second part of the twin-aims test of Erie,
to avoid inequitable administration of the laws, also directed the use of
state law to determine the validity of forum-selection clauses. 69
61. Stewart, 108 S. Ct. at 2248 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 2249.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. In a diversity setting, non-citizens would be able to take advantage of a more
favorable federal law while citizens of a state would be restricted to the less favorable state law.
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1938).
67. Id.
68. Id. The dissent noted three examples: First, whether filing a complaint or service toll a
statute of limitations, Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 752 (1980); second, whether
an arbitration clause is enforceable, Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 202--04 (1956);
third, whether an indemnity bond covers litigation expenses, Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337
U.S. 541, 555-56 (1949). Stewart, 108 S. Ct. at 2249 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
69. Stewart, 108 S. Ct. at 2249 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Vol. 64:439, 1989
Forum-Selection Clause Validity
II. ANALYSIS
A. The Federal Transfer Statute Should Not Govern the Validity of
Forum-Selection Clauses
The federal transfer statute should not govern forum-selection
clause validity because the language, the legislative history, and the
circumstances surrounding the enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) indi-
cate that Congress never intended the statute to do so. Instead, state
law should govern as required by Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins.7°
L The "Tnterest of Justice" Clause of 28 U.S. C. § 1404(a)
Disallows It From Governing Forum-Selection
Clause Validity
The federal transfer statute allows a federal district court to transfer
a case to a more convenient forum if it is in the "interest of justice."7 1
In Van Dusen v. Barrack72 the Supreme Court held that, following a
transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), the state law of the transferor
court was to be applied in the transferee court. 73 The Court stated
that it was in the interest of justice to disallow a change of law because
such a bonus to a change of venue would turn 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) into
a forum shopping device.74 Similarly, if federal district courts sitting
in diversity applied 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) to give a different effect to
forum-selection clauses than the state court in which the federal court
sits, the transfer statute would again promote forum shopping.75 Just
as it was in the interest of justice to apply the transferor court's law in
Van Dusen, it is in the interest of justice for 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) not to
govern forum-selection clause validity in order to achieve the same
goal-the prevention of forum shopping. Therefore, even if 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a) is construed to cover past considerations of a party's con-
venience, the "interest of justice" clause does not allow the statute to
govern forum-selection clause validity.
2. Congress Did Not Intend 28 US.C. § 1404(a) To Govern Forum-
Selection Clause Validity.
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) does not provide an unambiguous answer to
whether it should govern the validity of the parties' past considera-
70. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
71. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1982).
72. 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
73. Id. at 639.
74. Id. at 635-37, 637 n.36.
75. See infra notes 124-36 and accompanying text.
447
Washington Law Review
tions of convenience as embodied in a forum-selection clause.76 When
language is not clear, a court must look to intrinsic and extrinsic aids
to determine legislative intent."
a. Legislative History of 28 U.S. C. § 1404(a)
The legislative history of 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) suggests that Congress
did not intend the statute to govern the validity of forum-selection
clauses. The only legislative history to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) is the revi-
sor's note7 8 that states in part, "Subsection (a) was drafted in accord-
ance with the doctrine of forum non conveniens .... ,,7' The Supreme
Court has ruled that 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) is not technically a codifica-
tion, but a revision of the forum non conveniens doctrine. ° But
because most of the factors relevant in a forum non conveniens analysis
are relevant in an analysis under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), and because
many courts make reference to the doctrine of forum non conveniens
when deciding a 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) motion to transfer, 81 it is reason-
able to infer legislative intent from the revisor's note which character-
izes 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) as a codification of the doctrine offorum non
conveniens.
A year before the enactment of the Judiciary Act of 1948,82 the
Supreme Court set forth in Gulf Oil Co. v. Gilbert8 3 the relevant fac-
tors a district court must consider when contemplating a dismissal in
accordance with the doctrine of forum non conveniens.84 None of the
76. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 108 S. Ct. 2239, 2246 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
77. Intrinsic aids examine the internal structure of the statute and conventional meanings of
the terms used in it to determine the meaning of a statute. Extrinsic aids consist of background
text including legislative history and related statutes. Extrinsic aids are used to decipher the
legislative intent expressed by a statute. 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45.14,
at 70 (4th ed. 1984).
78. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) revisor's note (1982); Korbel, supra note 27, at 610 n.22 (the revisor's
note is the only available legislative history).
79. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) revisor's note (1982). The doctrine of forum non conveniens allows a
court to resist imposition upon its jurisdiction-even though the court has jurisdiction of the
action-when the litigation could be brought in a more convenient forum. Gulf Oil Co. v.
Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947); see J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL
PROCEDURE § 2.17, at 88-89 (1985).
80. Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 31-32 (1955).
81. See, e.g., Costlow v. Weeks, 790 F.2d 1486, 1488 (9th Cir. 1986); Davis v. Hill Eng'g Inc.,
549 F.2d 314, 323 (5th Cir. 1977); Rowles v. Hammermill Paper Co., 689 F. Supp. 494, 495
(E.D. Pa. 1988); Crosfield Hastech, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 672 F. Supp. 580, 589-90 (D.N.H.
1987).
82. Pub. L. No. 80-773, 62 Stat. 869 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1-2680 (1982 &
Supp. IV 1986)).
83. 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
84. Gilbert sets forth a balancing of conveniences that includes: Access to sources of proof;
ability to force attendance of unwilling witnesses; cost of obtaining willing witnesses; possibility
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factors set forth in Gilbert indicate that 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) should
determine the validity of forum-selection clauses. In fact, the Court
stated in Gilbert, that "[ulnless the balance is strongly in favor of the
defendant, the plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely be dis-
turbed."85 The Court's presumption in favor of plaintiff's choice of
forum suggests that not only was the doctrine offorum non conveniens
silent as to forum-selection clauses, but a court applying a forum non
conveniens analysis would not enforce such clauses because they would
interfere with the presumptive right of the plaintiff to choose the
forum.
b. Conditions Surrounding the Enactment of 28 US.C. § 1404(a)
At the time 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) was enacted, courts almost univer-
sally refused to enforce forum-selection clauses.86 In addition, state
law predominantly governed contractual matters.87 When Congress
has preempted what is traditionally governed by state contract law, it
has used explicit language.88 The dissent in Stewart used as an exam-
ple of such explicit language the Federal Arbitration Act,89 enacted
one year before 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), which states that an arbitration
clause "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity of the revocation of any con-
tract."9 It is unlikely that the federal transfer statute was intended to
include the validity of forum-selection clauses when at the time of
enactment forum-selection clauses were routinely disregarded, and a
federal enactment one year earlier regarding arbitration clauses, which
have been called a "kind of a forum-selection clause,"9 1 explicitly
to view premises (if appropriate); practical trial considerations of speed and expense;
enforceability of an obtained judgment; advantages and obstacles to a fair trial; plaintiff's choice
of forum; public interests, such as congestion of courts or burden on a jury to hear a case which
has no relation to the community; local interest in having localized controversies decided at
home; and having the state whose law governs apply its own law in its own forum. Id. at 508-09.
85. Id. at 508. One could argue that the plaintiff did choose a forum when he or she signed
the contract containing the forum-selection clause. At the time of signing, however, the
contracting parties were not parties to litigation and therefore neither could be the plaintiff or the
defendant. The defendant's choice of forum is the forum stipulated in the clause; the plaintiff's
choice, however, is favored under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
86. Gruson, supra note 4, at 138-39; Annotation, Validity of Contractual Provision Limiting
Place or Court in Which Action May Be Brought, 56 A.L.R.2d 300, 306 (1957) (superseded by 31
A.L.R.4th 404 (1984)); see supra note 6 and accompanying text.
87. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 108 S. Ct. 2239, 2247 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
88. Id.
89. Pub. L. No. 80-282, 61 Stat. 669 (codified at 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982)), cited in Stewart, 108 S.
Ct. at 2247 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
90. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
91. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519 (1974).
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assumed control over what had been traditionally governed by state
contract law.
3. Judicial Interpretation of 28 US. C. § 1404(a)
The factors to be considered in a 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) analysis were
originally based on the factors in a forum non conveniens analysis.92
Because the result of a successful 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) motion is a
transfer to another court, rather than a dismissal under the doctrine of
forum non conveniens, the discretion to be exercised in a 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a) analysis is quite broad and, as a result, a transfer may be
granted upon a lesser showing of inconvenience.93 Additional factors
are now relevant that were not relevant under the doctrine of forum
non conveniens.94 All of the traditional factors under the doctrine of
forum non conveniens and the factors which have developed since the
enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) are forward looking; they pertain to
conditions that currently exist or will exist in the future.95 No case
has ever set forth a factor to be considered under a 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)
analysis that looks to the past.
The language, legislative history, circumstances surrounding the
enactment, and subsequent judicial interpretations of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a) indicate that Congress did not intend the section to deter-
mine forum-selection clause validity. In spite of the intrinsic and
extrinsic evidence to the contrary, the majority in Stewart determined
that the discretionary, individualized nature of 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)
permitted the statute to govern the validity of forum-selection
clauses. 96 This expansive step was unwarranted. 97 Instead, 28 U.S.C.
92. See supra text accompanying note 79. For a list of factors relevant in a forum non
conveniens analysis, see supra note 84.
93. Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 32 (1955).
94. 1 J. MOORE, W. TAGGART & J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.145[5], at
1626-27 n.16 and accompanying text (2d ed. 1985). Some of the new factors include: Transferee
court judge is familiar with the complex details of the case, Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 447 F.2d 122,
125 (2d Cir. 1971); convenience of a third-party defendant, Krupp Int'l, Inc. v. Yarn Industries,
Inc., 615 F. Supp. 1103, 1107 (D. Del. 1985); physical condition of the parties, L.B. Sales Corp.
v. Dial Mfg., Inc., 593 F. Supp. 290, 295 (E.D. Wis. 1984); evidence of a suit pending in another
district, Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 282 F. Supp. 562, 563-64 (E.D. Tenn.
1968). These new factors have been the result of increased litigation complexity. The standard
traditional factors are still the same as those used in a forum non conveniens analysis.
95. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 108 S. Ct. 2239, 2246 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see
15 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 24, §§ 3848-49, 3851, 3853-54.
96. Stewart, 108 S. Ct. at 2244.
97. When there is some uncertainty about the intended scope of a rule, if the broader
construction would interfere with state substantive policies it should be avoided if the text
permits. See Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 749-51 (1980). Since Hanna v.
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965), the federal rules have been construed to avoid conflict with
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§ 1404(a) should have been ruled inapplicable because the statute itself
allows a transfer only if it is in the interest of justice, and justice is not
served by a rule that promotes forum shopping. Because neither 28
U.S.C. § 1404(a) nor any other federal statute governs forum-selection
clause validity, an Erie9" analysis should be applied to determine
whether a federal judge-made rule or state law should govern their
validity.
B. State Law Should Govern Under an Erie Analysis
Assuming 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) was not intended to determine the
validity of forum-selection clauses, the issue becomes whether federal
courts may create a rule to govern the validity of forum-selection
clauses.99 Federal courts have the authority to fashion procedural
rules for the conduct of their business."° Federal courts, however,
cannot create substantive law except in limited circumstances. 10 As
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Stewart correctly noted, the
distinction between procedure and substance is difficult and often mis-
leading." 2 Distinguishing between procedure and substance is espe-
important state policies. P. BATER, D. MELTZER, D. MISHKIN & D. SHAPIRO, HART &
WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS & THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 828 (3d ed. 1988).
98. For a discussion of Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), see infra notes 105-11
and accompanying text.
99. Stewart, 108 S. Ct. at 2248 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The majority, finding that 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a) governed forum-selection clause validity, did not evaluate whether federal judge-made
law or state law governed under the twin-aims test of Erie. Id. at 2245 n. 11.
100. 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1982). Section 2071 reads: "The Supreme Court and all courts
established by Act of Congress may from time to time prescribe rules for the conduct of their
business. Such rules shall be consistent with Acts of Congress and rules of practice and
procedure prescribed by the Supreme Court." See also Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472
(1965) (federal courts have power to make rules governing the practice and pleading in those
courts); Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1941) (Congress may regulate practice of
federal courts but cannot abolish the substantive law of a state unless it is a field committed to
Congress by the Constitution).
101. Erie banished "general federal law" but "specialized" or "limited" common law
remains. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 313 (1981); Friendly, In Praise of Erie-
And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 383, 405 (1964). The Court, in Texas
Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981), recognized generally two
instances where federal common law should be applied: First, where it is needed to protect a
uniquely federal interest, and second, where Congress has given the courts power to develop
substantive law. See generally 19 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 14, § 4514. A forum-selection
clause is not a uniquely federal concern such as commercial paper, government bonds, or
government contracts. Nor has Congress given the courts power to develop substantive law with
regard to forum-selection clauses. Therefore, validating forum-selection clauses using federal
common law is inappropriate. But see Moretti & Perlow Law Offices v. Aleet Assoc., 668 F.
Supp. 103 (D.R.I. 1987); see also Comment, supra note 16, at 1111-12.
102. The terms substance and procedure may imply different concepts depending on the
particular problem they are used for. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945).
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cially difficult with forum-selection clauses because on the one hand
they are contractual, and therefore substantive, while on the other
hand they govern venue, which is considered procedural. 1 3 The
guidelines set forth in Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins' °4 and its progeny
determine whether a rule of law is procedural or substantive.
1. Erie Doctrine
The Rules of Decision Act 10 5 states that "[t]he laws of several
states, except where the Constitution, treaties or statutes of the United
States shall otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of
decisions in trials at common law in the courts of the United States in
cases where they apply." The Supreme Court, in Swift v. Tyson,106
had earlier held that "the laws of several states" applied only to a
state's legislative laws and did not include a state's common laws. 107
In Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins'018 the Court overruled Swift, concluding
that the majority in Swift had misinterpreted the congressional intent
of the Rules of Decision Act. 10 9 The Court announced the new rule
that federal courts sitting in diversity will "apply as their rules of deci-
sion the law of the State, unwritten as well as written."' 0 Justice
Reed's concurring opinion noted that federal law would still apply to
procedural matters.1 ' Because the distinction between procedure and
substance was unclear, the Court in three post-Erie cases attempted to
formulate a test to determine questions of procedure and substance.
The first case, Guaranty Trust Co. v. York," 2 held that a federal
court sitting in diversity must apply state law to an issue which argua-
bly could be either procedural or substantive, if applying federal law
would result in a different outcome than would application of state
law.' 1 3 This "outcome determinative" test, however, proved too
mechanical because virtually any federal procedural rule could affect
103. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 779 F.2d 643, 651 (11th Cir. 1986) (Godbold, C.J.,
dissenting), aff'd on other grounds, 108 S. Ct. 2239 (1988).
104. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
105. Judiciary Act of 1789, § 34 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1982)).
106. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
107. Id. at 12-13, 18.
108. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
109. Id. at 79.
110. Id. at 73.
111. Id. at 92 (Reed, J., concurring).
112. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
113. Id. at 109.
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the outcome of a case. 114 There was, as one commentator noted, no
extreme to which the argument had not been pushed." 5
Because the "outcome determinative" test was unworkable, the
Supreme Court reformulated the Erie doctrine in Byrd v. Blue Ridge
Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc." 6 The Court in Byrd noted that the
possibility of a different outcome in a federal diversity case was not, on
its own, determinative. 1 7 In addition to applying the "outcome deter-
minative" test, courts should weigh the federal and state policies in
question. 118
The balancing approach of Byrd lacked an objective standard, how-
ever, and courts had difficulty applying the balancing test." 9 As a
result, the Supreme Court addressed the issue once more in Hanna v.
Plumer20 to establish a rule by which to determine when a federal
court would be allowed to apply its "procedural" laws. In Hanna, the
Court determined that a federal court sitting in diversity could apply
its own service of process rule since a difference in service of process
between state and federal courts would not subvert the twin aims of
Erie.'2 ' The Court articulated the twin aims of Erie as: First, to dis-
courage forum shopping and second, to avoid inequitable administra-
tion of the laws.' 22 Thus, to determine whether state law must govern
or whether a federal judge-made rule may govern a forum-selection
clause's validity, the issue must be analyzed with respect to the twin-
aims test of Erie as formulated in Hanna.123
114. See Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REv. 693, 709 (1974) (outcome
determinative test was too broad and a backlash was inevitable).
115. Weintraub, The Erie Doctrine and State Conflict of Laws Rules, 39 IND. L.J. 228, 234
(1963/64).
116. 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
117. Id. at 537.
118. Id. at 536-40.
119. Different courts weighed certain policies differently and some courts weighed the same
policy differently in different cases. For example, the Second Circuit in Jaftex Corp. v. Randolph
Mills, Inc., 282 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1960), found that federal standards would dictate whether a
foreign corporation was present in a state. Id. at 511-13. Three years later, in Arrowsmith v.
United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963), the same court overruled Jaftex holding that the
state policy was more significant than the policies underlying application of federal law. Id. at
229-30. The confusion was greater than what normally accompanied a balancing test since the
continued validity of York's "outcome determinative" test was in question. See Ely, supra note
114, at 709 n.93; see also Comment, Of Lawyers and Laymen: A Study of Federalism, the Judicial
Process, and Erie, 71 YALE L.J. 344, 351 (1961).
120. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
121. Id. at 468-70, 469 n.11.
122. Id. at 467.
123. The outcome determinative test of York was not repudiated but was refined by Hanna.
Ely, supra note 114, at 717-18. The status of the Byrd balancing test is less certain. 19 WRIGHT
& MILLER, supra note 14, § 4504, at 43.
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2. Application of the Twin-Aims Test of Erie to Forum-Selection
Clauses
a. A Federal Rule that Validates Forum-Selection Clauses
Encourages Forum Shopping
Because a change in venue may affect court congestion, the relative
access to sources of proof, the availability of a compulsory process for
unwilling witnesses, and a party's knowledge of special local condi-
tions and laws,' 24 the selection of the best forum is a critical pre-litiga-
tion decision. The importance of venue is supported by the fact that
many commercial agreements include forum-selection clauses. 25
In Van Dusen v. Barrack, '26 the Court ruled that a transfer of venue
under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) did not also mean a change in substantive
law.'27 The transferor court's law, therefore, would be applied in the
transferee court. 128  Venue considerations, 129 however, do not raise
substantive law issues but rather important "procedural" convenience
factors. 130 A convenient forum is often a less costly forum. 31  The
cost of an inconvenient forum can alter the practical outcome1 32 of a
case to the point that parties have an incentive to shop for the most
convenient forum for themselves or the most inconvenient forum for
their opponent. Therefore, although Van Dusen disallows a change in
substantive law after a 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) transfer, a difference
between state and federal enforcement of forum-selection clauses may
affect a party's ability to bring or defend a suit depending on the con-
venience of the venue stipulated in the clause. As a result, a difference
between state and federal law governing the validity of forum-selection
124. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 257-61 (1981); Gulf Oil v. Gilbert, 330
U.S. 501, 508-09 (1947).
125. Forum-selection clauses have become more prevalent in commercial contracts since the
Bremen decision, which held that the clauses are presumptively valid. Covey & Morris, The
Enforceability of Agreements Providing For Forum and Choice of Law Selection, 61 DEN. U.L.
REV. 837, 841 (1984).
126. 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
127. Id. at 635-36.
128. Id. at 639.
129. See supra text accompanying note 124.
130. The outcome of a case can be determined on grounds other than a change in the
substantive law that governs the merits of the case. Provisions for discovery and a party's ability
to amend pleadings, for example, often lead to the difference between winning and losing a
lawsuit. If such matters were not governed by the Rules Enabling Act, deciding them under
federal law would be prohibited by Erie. Ely, supra note 114, at 721-22.
131. E.g., Solar Electronics, Inc. v. Tandy Corp., (N.D. Ill. June 29, 1987) (WESTLAW
13427); Blumenthal v. Management Assistance, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 470, 474 (N.D. Ill. 1979);
Fluor Corp. v. Pullman, Inc., 446 F. Supp. 777, 778-79 (W.D. Okla. 1977); Mobile Oil Corp. v.
W.R. Grace & Co., 334 F. Supp. 117, 124-25 n.5 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
132. See supra note 123.
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clauses may lead to as much forum shopping as a change in the law
governing the merits of the case.
In Hanna the Court determined that the difference between federal
and state service of process procedures would not promote forum
shopping. 133 Where service of process occurs after a party commences
a suit, the decision to bring a suit is the first a party must make. As a
result, venue, as stipulated by a forum-selection clause, is more likely
to cause forum shopping because parties will recognize a difference in
state and federal forum-selection clause enforcement and attempt to
manipulate the difference to their advantage.
Because venue significantly affects convenience, and parties will rec-
ognize any difference between federal and state law, they will attempt
to manipulate the differences in order to escape or enforce a venue
stipulated in a forum-selection clause. Although differences among
states may lead to interstate forum shopping, this is not the sort of
forum shopping that Erie attempted to eliminate.13 4 Erie was con-
cerned with uniformity of laws among federal and state courts of the
same state. 135 If federal law enforces forum-selection clauses and state
law does not, an in-state plaintiff will bring suit in a state court to
avoid the clause and an out-of-state defendant will be encouraged to
"shop" for the more advantageous federal law by removing to a fed-
eral court. An out-of-state plaintiff hoping to avoid a forum-selection
clause stipulating a forum of a different state will bring suit in a state
court. A resident defendant will not be able to remove because of the
"one way" nature of the federal removal statute.136
b. A Federal Rule that Validates Forum-Selection Clauses Results
in the Inequitable Administration of the Laws
In Walker v. Armco Steel Corp. 37 the Court held that failing either
prong of the twin-aims test of Erie is enough to warrant the applica-
tion of state law. Applying federal law to enforce forum-selection
clauses will produce an inequitable administration of the laws. Inequi-
133. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 473-74 (1965).
134. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941); Ely, supra note 114, at
714-15 n.125 (between horizontal uniformity among all federal courts and vertical uniformity
between federal and state courts of a given state, uniformity of one inevitably sacrifices the
other).
135. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 467.
136. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1982). Section 1441(b) does not allow an in-state defendant to
remove to a federal court in a diversity case. The rationale is that an in-state resident does not
need protection from a state court which may be biased in favor of in-state residents. See J.
FRiEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, supra note 79, § 2.11, at 58 (1985).
137. 446 U.S. 740 (1980).
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table administration of the laws results when there is unfair discrimi-
nation between citizens and non-citizens of the forum state. 38  An
out-of-state plaintiff desiring a certain state court may effectively avoid
a forum-selection clause by bringing suit in a state court that does not
enforce such clauses. Not only is this forum shopping, but it will also
result in discrimination against the resident plaintiff who, due to the
accident of diversity, will not be able to enforce the forum-selection
clause as allowed in the federal court. In addition, it is unfair that a
suit in which both parties are in-state residents is decided differently
than a similar case in a federal court where jurisdiction is based upon
diversity. 139
Under an Erie analysis, therefore, state law should be applied
because a difference in venue laws leads to a significant difference in
convenience, which in turn will lead to forum shopping. In addition, a
difference between state and federal law unfairly discriminates against
in-state defendants who can not remove to a federal court under 28
U.S.C. § 1441(b). Discrimination against in-state residents also occurs
when both parties are residents of the same state and therefore not
able to take advantage of a federal law that enforces forum-selection
clauses. Discrimination of this sort results in inequitable administra-
tion of the laws.
C. Desirable Effects of State Law Governing the Validity of Forum-
Selection Clauses
The Supreme Court should have avoided a novel and unwarranted
expansion of 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Applying state law would have
been in line with the twin aims of Erie. More importantly, the use of
state law would have achieved a more desirable result.
The Supreme Court's decision in Stewart suggests that the Court
desires uniform enforcement of forum-selection clauses to ensure the
certainty and predictability benefits of such clauses."4 It is uncertain,
138. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1938); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460,
467-69 (1965). A resident defendant has no right to removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1982), see
supra note 136. Therefore, non-citizens are favored over citizens when state and federal law
differ.
139. See Ely, supra note 114, at 712-13 n.112.
140. The Supreme Court stated in Stewart that the Bremen case may prove "instructive" in
resolving the dispute. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 108 S. Ct. 2239, 2243 (1988). Bremen
was an admiralty case holding that a forum-selection clause was to be presumptively enforced
because it would increase trade by eliminating uncertainty. See supra notes 12-13 and
accompanying text. In addition, Justice Kennedy, in the Stewart concurring opinion, noted that
enforcement of forum-selection clauses would further the vital interests of justice and protect the
legitimate expectations of the parties. He stated that courts should encourage such clauses by
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however, whether federal courts located in a state that does not
enforce forum-selection clauses will enforce such clauses even after
applying the Stewart analysis. In fact, on remand, the district court
found that the other factors in a 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) analysis out-
weighed the forum-selection clause, and the district court refused to
transfer the case. ' 41 Therefore, the end result was the same as if state
law had been applied.
The decision in Stewart may have been premature as well as ineffec-
tive. The Supreme Court eventually could have achieved universal
enforcement of forum-selection clauses by determining state law gov-
erns the issue in accordance with Erie. Although the use of state law
would create inconsistency in theory, because some states enforce
forum-selection clauses and others do not, uniformity would result in
practice. All but four states have adopted a rule which enforces
forum-selection clauses. 42 The trend is toward enforcing forum-selec-
tion clauses, and state courts in the past thirty-five years have over-
turned precedent to the contrary. 43 When all states have adopted a
rule to enforce forum-selection clauses, the result will be uniform
enforcement in state and, therefore, federal courts.'" If state law had
governed the validity, however, the clause may have carried more
weight in a 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) motion to transfer.
III. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court misconstrued the legislative intent behind 28
U.S.C. § 1404(a) by allowing the statute to govern contractual forum-
selection clause validity. In so doing, the Court failed to achieve, and
may have prevented, uniformity in enforcement of forum-selection
clauses. Because federal standards will control enforcement, state
courts will have fewer opportunities to overturn obsolete precedent
concerning forum-selection clauses. Regardless of the Stewart deci-
giving them controlling weight in a § 1404(a) analysis. Stewart, 108 S. Ct. at 2249-50 (Kennedy,
J., concurring).
141. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 696 F. Supp. 583 (N.D. Ala. 1988).
142. Alabama, Georgia, Missouri, and Texas refuse to enforce forum-selection clauses.
Comment, supra note 16, at 1095 n.28.
143. Annotation, Validity of Contractual Provision Limiting Place or Court in Which Action
May Be Brought, 31 A.L.R.4th 404, 408-09 (1984).
144. The Stewart decision may impede the chances of the four remaining states to adopt the
majority rule. Many cases involving forum-selection clauses involve parties from different states.
An out-of-state defendant will remove to a federal court in order to obtain the benefits of the
Stewart rule that validates forum-selection clauses. As a result, the four remaining states will
have far fewer cases concerning forum-selection clauses remaining in the state courts and
therefore fewer opportunities to overturn their antiquated precedents that invalidate forum-
selection clauses.
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sion, there is some doubt whether federal district courts sitting in
diversity will enforce such clauses in a state that refuses to do so.
Further, the Court's treatment of forum-selection clauses as a fed-
eral procedural issue violates the policies underlying Erie and Hanna.
Differences between state and federal treatment of the clauses may
increase forum shopping between state and federal courts and
encourage the inequitable administration of the laws between residents
and non-residents. Despite Stewart, a district court with diversity
jurisdiction should not enforce a clause that is unenforceable under the
forum state's law because enforcement would violate the "interest of
justice" clause of 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) by encouraging forum shopping.
By not enforcing forum-selection clauses in such instances, the out-
come would not only be in accordance with Erie, Hanna, and the
"interest of justice" clause of 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), but would eventu-
ally lead to a system that uniformly enforces forum-selection clauses.
That result would be achieved without overextending a federal house-
keeping statute to pre-empt state law.
Eric FahlIman
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